Six weeks after the French and German cabinets had, at their dramatic meetings of 9 May 1950, agreed on the essentials of the Schuman Plan for pooling the French and German coal and steel industries, Buchman was gazetted a Chevalier of the Legion of Honour for his 'contribution to better understanding between France and Germany'.1 Two years later, the German Government awarded him the Grand Cross of the Order of Merit 'in recognition of his significant work for peace and understanding between nations'.2

From the first this led to speculation in the British press. Robert Schuman, because of the decoration's special link with Germany, arranged for the French Senator, Madame Eugénie Eboué, to present it at Gelsenkirchen during Buchman's visit for the Moral Re-Armament demonstration in early June - a week before it was officially gazetted. The Evening Standard questioned on l0 June, quite reasonably, whether the honour had actually been conferred.3 It went on, however, to state that Buchman had never met Schuman. Meanwhile the New Statesman attributed the Schuman Plan as a whole to 'Buchman's pious anti-Socialism'.4 Neither report was high in accuracy. Nor were the assertions made by some enthusiasts in after years that Buchman had been almost solely responsible for the Franco-German reconciliation after the war. What was, in fact, his part?

Obviously, Buchman had nothing to do with the details of the Plan to bring the coal and steel industries of Europe under a single authority. That had been the work, over a long period, of Jean Monnet and a small team of dedicated experts who only presented it to Schuman himself in April 1950. Nor had Buchman been responsible for putting the idea of a closer European unity into the mind of either Schuman or Adenauer. Schuman had believed in the need to bring France and Germany together in some such way since the 1950s,5 while Adenauer was considering the possibility of linking the steel industries of the two countries as far back as 1923.6

Nor would it be accurate to infer, as some have, that Buchman was in any way responsible for planting in either Schuman or Adenauer the concern to rebuild Europe on a Christian basis. Both were devout Catholics and had long cherished that hope.


Schuman once seriously thought of entering the priesthood but, in his own words, 'chose to aid atheists to live rather than Christians to die'.7Some of his friends regarded him as a 'saint in a jacket', but he thought of himself as 'a very imperfect instrument of a Providence which makes use of us in accomplishing designs which go far beyond ourselves'.8 He believed in the individual direction of God. 'Often he tacked about, delayed a decision, tried to dodge the call which was making itself heard in the depths of his conscience,' wrote his close collaborator, the Socialist leader André Philip. 'Then, when he was sure what the inner voice was demanding, he took the boldest initiative and pushed it to its conclusion, equally oblivious of attacks as of threats.'9

Adenauer, too, was deeply rooted in his faith. When Hitler hounded him out of office as Lord Mayor of Cologne in 1933, he sought refuge at Maria Laach Monastery, which was presided over by an old school friend, Ildefons Herwegen; and when Hitler was overthrown he, like Schuman, was convinced that Germany and Europe could only be rebuilt on Christian foundations. He regarded the uniting of Europe as 'not only a political and economic aim worth striving for, but as a real Christian obligation'.10 He too sought God's direction in affairs - often, according to one biographer, while shaving.

The carrying through of the Schuman Plan was made possible by the pressure of outside events - the determination to avoid yet another war between France and Germany, and the emergence of an aggressive Soviet Union - and by the convergence of an unusual group of men who were 'kindred spirits'. Professor Henri Rieben, Director of the Jean Monnet Institute in Lausanne, used that phrase to describe Monnet and Buchman, who never, in fact, met. Buchman, he said, had 'geo-political diagnosis plus inspiration', and did on a spiritual level what Monnet did on a political level.11 The same phrase can be used even more certainly to describe Buchman, Schuman and Adenauer,12 despite the fact that the last two sometimes doubted each other. Each played an essential part, sometimes together, often independently. As far as Buchman was concerned, he had once more been led to people whom he could assist, by word and action, to make their highest hopes come true.

Adenauer had first been attracted by Buchman's open-hearted reception of the Germans at Caux which, in Reinhold Maier's words, 'ended the moral outlawry of Germany'.13 At Caux itself, Adenauer was impressed that 'people have the courage to stand for good and for God and that each begins with himself '14-a point he was to reiterate. Finally, 'the great success' of Buchman's work in the Ruhr was to convince him of Moral Re-Armament's effectiveness. That work, too, was a prerequisite of Franco-German rapprochement. As the Neue Zürcher Zeitung wrote in 1959: 'The Ruhr, instead of being the apple of discord for Europe, has become the growing point of international agreement. . . Without the Ruhr, no High Authority;* without the High Authority, no Common Market and no far-reaching plan for European integration.'15

(* The governing body set up under the Schuman Plan.)


In March 1949 in Bern, in one of his early political speeches outside Germany, he mentioned the promising attitude of some French leaders and the new outlook in the Benelux countries. He concluded, 'In large sectors of the German public, there is a profound conviction that only a union of the countries of Western Europe can save this old continent. If France behaves wisely and generously towards Germany, she will render historic service to Europe.'16

In the same month Robert Schuman, now France's Foreign Minister, dined with Louis Boucquey and two of Buchman's close colleagues, Philippe Mottu and John Caulfeild. According to their reports, Schuman talked at length about the Atlantic Pact, which was about to be signed, describing it as a defective diplomatic instrument if confined to the political and military spheres: 'We must reach the masses so that the Pact will be sustained not only by the atom bomb, but by a change in the way of life of the Western world. In the economic field we have the Marshall Plan; in the political and military field the Atlantic Pact. Now we need to give fresh ideological content to the life of the millions of Europe.' Then he added, 'The Germans need a lot of courage to work with the French. It is no good being sentimental about these things. We all need to reach a deep inner change in order to find the solutions to our major problems.'17

This so closely coincided with Buchman's own thought that Boucquey asked Schuman if he would write a foreword to the French edition of Buchman's speeches, which had appeared in English under the title Remaking the World. Schuman accepted, although he remarked, 'I have not yet crossed the Rubicon.'18 The opportunity to write the foreword came when a mild attack of flu gave him a brief respite in February 1950. By that time he had met Buchman again, and he was later to say that reading the book gave him 'a glimpse of the meaning of Frank Buchman's life, past and present'.19 Certainly, his foreword expressed Buchman's aims and methods during these years with extraordinary accuracy. After stating that 'thus far statesmen have only been moderately successful in "remaking the world"', he wrote that if Buchman had presented some new scheme for public welfare or just another theory he would have remained sceptical, but that, on the contrary, 'What Moral Re-Armament brings us is a philosophy of life applied in action'. Then in three succinct sentences he outlined Buchman's programme: 'To begin by creating a moral climate in which true brotherly unity can flourish, overarching all that today tears the world apart - that is the immediate goal. The acquisition of wisdom about men and affairs by bringing people together in public assemblies and public encounters - that is the means employed. To provide teams of trained people, ready for the service of the state, apostles of reconciliation and builders of a new world - that is the beginning of a far-reaching transformation of society in which, during fifteen war-ravaged years, the first steps have already been made.'


'It is not a question of a change in policy: it is a question of changing people,' Schuman added. 'Democracy and her freedoms can be saved only by the quality of the people who speak in her name.'20

Schuman wrote these words at a time when his efforts towards Franco-German agreement seemed likely to be frustrated. 'I had a sort of intuition that came to me through that book,' he recalled three years later. 'I saw new perspectives opening before me.'21

Western defence, then, had been secured by the signing in April 1949 of the Atlantic Pact. The larger task, as Schuman saw it, of 'giving ideological content to the lives of the masses', remained. Buchman was making this a main theme at Caux in the summer of 1949 and, with Schuman's agreement, printed the essence of what Schuman had said at Boucquey's dinner in the invitation. He also asked Schuman and Adenauer to come to Caux and help him. Schuman agreed and suggested dates in June which suited Adenauer. 'Your desire to dedicate a week at Caux is of major importance for the pressing problems of France and Germany,'22 Buchman replied. He also wrote to Minister-President Arnold that if the leaders could 'get together and have a common mind under the guidance of God, then He can give the answer to the extremely difficult and seemingly insoluble problems that present themselves'.23

In the event, Schuman was tied up throughout June at the fruitless Paris meeting on German reunification and asked Georges Villiers, President of the French Employers' Federation, to represent him at Caux. Adenauer, too, wrote, 'I am extremely sorry that, contrary to my original intentions, I could not get to Caux last week. Now that we have decided on the elections and choice of government I have been completely taken up with the preparations, but I hope to come later to Caux and to have the pleasure of seeing you again. I would like to express my thanks once more for the help you have shown us Germans in making it possible for us to meet people from other countries again and so to bridge the gulf which, alas, still separates us from the rest of the world.'24


Over 1,300 other Germans, however, did come to Caux that year, including Alfred Hartman, the financial director of the British and American zones, Hans Böckler, the head of the German trades unions, and many other key figures, including twelve state cabinet ministers. From North Rhine-Wesphalia, for example, came seventeen politicians, eleven newspaper editors, fifty-nine industrialists and eighty-one members of works councils. The problem of Franco-German relations was, according to L'Aube, Schuman's MRP party paper, dealt with frankly and courageously.25

One day Villiers sat at table beside Böckler, whose part in creating the new Germany some historians consider second only to Adenauer's.26Böckler said, 'We ought to be enemies on two counts - I am a German, you are French; you are the head of the employers, I am a trade union leader.'

Villiers replied, 'Yes, and there's a third count. Your countrymen condemned me to death; I was in a political concentration camp; I saw most of my comrades die around me. But that is all past. We must forget it. And personally, I would like to shake your hand.'27

Countless similar encounters took place at Caux, not only between the Germans and the smaller but influential French delegation,* but also between them and former enemies from other countries. As Price concludes: 'It was not merely the personal trust relationship between Adenauer and Schuman that had been built (and Schuman had a deep distrust of the Germans). It was between hundreds and thousands of men and women - opinion formers at all levels and occupations at Caux - which gave a decisive impetus to European unity at a critical time.'28

(* Among other French to attend Caux in the first years were Paul Bacon, Vice- President of the Provisional Assembly and then Minister of Labour in several governments, business men like Pierre Carteron, President of the French Association of Insurance Companies, and Robert Carmichael, President of the Jute Industry, and trades unionists such as Yves Fournis, General Secretary of the Foremen, Technicians and Engineers' Association, and Maurice Mercier, one of the founders of the Force Ouvrière. Henri Lespès, a Deputy and later a member of the French High Court of Justice, had been one of those to urge Irène Laure to go to Caux. His assessment was: 'At Caux is the centre of international renaissance which all have been longing for.' (Manchester Guardian, 26 August 1946.)

On 25 October 1949 Boucquey invited Buchman and Schuman to dine together in his home, where they talked freely through a long evening. It had been a frustrating summer for Schuman, and he felt discouraged by his inability to move his colleagues and his nation forward along the road to a new Europe. Prime Minister Georges Bidault, for example, was at first indifferent, if not opposed, to any such proposition. When Boucquey spoke of the honour of having the two men at his table Schuman replied, 'If I have contributed anything to mankind, I must also admit that much of my work has been destroyed and frustrated. But Dr Buchman, because he has concentrated his efforts on one section of human life - the most important one - has the joy of seeing them succeed and spread all over the world. Statesmen can propose far-reaching plans, but they cannot put them into effect without far-reaching changes in the hearts of people - that is your work, and it is the kind of work I would like to do for the rest of my life.'


Then turning to Buchman, he said, 'I need your advice. For years I have wanted to get out of politics and write about the lessons of my life. I have no family or dependents. There is a monastery where I would be welcome. It has a library. It is quiet. I feel I could do my best work there. Will you advise me? What should I do?'

Buchman looked at him. 'Monsieur Schuman, what do you think in your own heart you should do?' he asked.

Schuman threw up his hands and a broad smile creased his expressive face. 'You shouldn't have asked me. Of course, I know I must stay where I am.'

Then very seriously he added, 'There is one thing I must do. I feel it in my bones and it has led me as far as I have gone recently, but I am afraid of it. I am from Lorraine, and I was brought up as a German. Then Lorraine returned to France and I became a Frenchman and served in the French army. I know the problems and mentality of both countries. I have known for a long time that I have a big part in ending the hatred between us. I have talked about it with de Gasperi.* He is in the same situation - born Austrian and served in the Austrian army, then Italian, and understanding both. We know that something can and must be done and that we are the men to do it. But I shrink from it.'

(* Then Prime Minister of Italy. De Gasperi was a pupil of the priest, Don Luigi Sturzo, whom he succeeded as leader of the Popular Party in 1923, only to be imprisoned when the party was dissolved in 1926.)

'Yes, you must stay where you are,' Buchman said. 'Under God that is your place.'

'One difficulty', Schuman went on, 'is that I do not know whom to trust in the new Germany. Adenauer, for instance, I have only just met.'

Buchman replied, 'We have had some excellent men in Caux and I can give you a dozen names.' He gave Schuman a list.

'I am going officially to Germany in the next weeks', Schuman said, 'and I will look them up.'

In Boucquey's guest book Schuman wrote, 'This evening spent with Dr Buchman and the close friends in his great work has been a treasured first step which will lead me, I very much hope, to Caux.'29


How often Schuman and Adenauer had already met by this time is disputed. Schuman says that a meeting in Koblenz in August 1949 was their first encounter.30 Adenauer, in his memoirs, writes of an earlier meeting in October I948,31 while another source speaks of them spending a day together, sometime in 1949, at the monastery of Maria Laach.32

The important point seems to have been not how often they had met, but that neither of them fully trusted the other at this time. Schuman might recognise intellectually, as he said to Boucquey, that 'Germans would need a lot of courage to work with the French', but he still had deep suspicions of his own about the Germans. Adenauer's meeting with him in October 1948, for which there is independent evidence, seems to have been rather unsuccessful, not least because Adenauer had had to listen to Schuman's 'personal theory' that Germany should be divided up into Rhine, Elbe and Danube states.33 It is difficult today to remember how deep a chasm seventy years of enmity had left between even the most sympathetic French and German minds. What part, if any, the evening with Buchman played in determining Schuman to continue his European mission it is hard to assess. Another influence upon him at this time must have been Dean Acheson's encouragement during the NATO Council in September 1949 that he should take initiative towards Germany, perhaps in concert with America and Britain; and Stalin's continued aggressiveness was a constant spur to action. However, Christopher (now Lord) Mayhew spoke of conversations in which Schuman said that Buchman had helped him to continue with the Germans.34

In December 1949 Buchman was in Bonn. A lunch in his honour was given by President Heuss and a number of Ministers. Afterwards he went to the Palais Schaumburg where Chancellor Adenauer was waiting in high spirits. He had just listened to seven professors each make a half-hour speech, and it had, he said, given him time for peaceful reflection. He thanked Buchman for what he had done for Germany, and asked warmly after Schuman and his concern for a new relationship between France and Germany. The conversation passed to news of Moral Re-Armament. The Chancellor, who had a strong sense of the practical, maintained that his son Georg was studying better since his visit to Caux. Buchman disclaimed all responsibility and laughingly said it must be due to his father's good influence. The Chancellor countered that his two secretaries who had been in Caux were also working better. When he offered to show Buchman the Palais Schaumburg Buchman surprised him by saying, 'I believe I know it very well already. I used to stay here when it was Princess Victoria's home.'


Less than a month later, on 13 January 1950, Schuman made his promised call on the Chancellor. When he arrived Bonn station was almost empty except for Adenauer, who hurried him to a waiting car as, he explained, he feared an attack on Schuman 'because you French are on the way to absorbing the Saar'.35 Schuman's opening statement was full of faith that Germany and France could co-operate in future, and the two men moved closer together. However, nothing was settled about the Saar, though Adenauer seems to have got the impression that Schuman thought that, one day, the Saar might be returned to Germany: an impression he had also carried away from their previous talk in October 1948. Things, however, did not work out so smoothly. On 3 March the French Government took steps to integrate the Saar into France.36 So, when three of Buchman's friends called on Adenauer on 7 April, they found him greatly incensed with Schuman. 'He is a liar,' Adenauer told them. 'Even Bidault lets me call Schuman a lying Alsatian peasant.' His visitors suggested that, if this were true, Adenauer himself should think how to change Schuman. 'I also need to change more myself,' Adenauer replied, reiterating the impression that the thought of each starting with himself had made upon him at Caux.37

At all events there was a moment when it looked as if the great opportunity might be missed. Jean Monnet noted that there was 'une atmosphère glacée' at the January meeting in Bonn38 and remarked to Schuman, 'We are on the brink of making the same mistake as in 1919,'39even though Adenauer describes their last two-hour session of the meetings as 'characterised by mutual trust'.40 By April there was no doubt about the danger of breakdown. 'We were in an impasse in almost whatever direction we turned . . .we were surrounded by walls,' Schuman said later. 'In order to advance we had to open a breach. First of all we had to get rid of the terrible mortgage of fate - fear. We felt the need of some psychological leap forward. . .'41

Monnet provided that leap by producing his plan for the coal and steel pool which had hurriedly been completed. On 20 April he gave a copy to Bidault who ignored it. On 28 April he passed a copy through his chef de cabinet to Schuman who realised that time was running perilously short if there was to be an agreement by 11 May, when a crucial foreign ministers' conference was to take place. Schuman studied it over a weekend, and said on his return, 'I'll use it.'42 At a lunch with Monnet in the first week of May he suggested that the plan should be introduced in a sudden and dramatic way. They agreed that only two French Ministers, Mayer and Pleven, should be told the details before the Cabinet of 9 May, while Bidault (who dismissed the project as 'a soap bubble - just one more international body') was only told in general terms.43


On 9 May the German Cabinet too was in session. Adenauer, while at the Cabinet table, was handed a letter from Schuman containing an outline of the plan. Recognising, as he said later, that this was 'a magnanimous step ... of extraordinary importance for the peace of Europe and of the entire world', Adenauer replied, accepting, within the hour. 'Because a personal relationship of trust had been formed,' comments Price, 'the opportunity was not lost.'44 So when Schuman brought the proposal before his Cabinet an hour later, with the strong support of Mayer and Pleven, it was approved.45

In 1951, two months after the Schuman Plan agreement was finally signed, Adenauer sent to Buchman in America a message which was reported in the New York Herald-Tribune under the headline 'Moral Re-Armament is Credited for Role in Schuman Plan Talks'.46 Adenauer wrote, 'In recent months we have seen the conclusion, after some difficult negotiations, of important international agreements. Here Moral Re-Armament has played an invisible but effective part in bridging differences of opinion between negotiating parties, and has kept before them the object of peaceful agreement in the search for the common good which is the true purpose of human life... It is my conviction too that men and nations cannot outwardly enjoy stable relationships until they have been inwardly prepared for them. In this respect, Moral Re-Armament has rendered great and lasting service.'47 The presentation of the German Order of Merit to Buchman followed in the next year.

It was not until 1953 that Schuman was able to fulfil his promise to visit Caux. After attending every meeting during his brief stay and seeing two plays, he asked if he might speak. 'I leave in a spirit noticeably different from the one in which I came here,' he said. 'I have been in politics for thirty-four years, and during that length of time one learns to be sceptical. I am leaving with much less scepticism than when I came, and at my age that is a considerable advance.' What had impressed him more than anything else, he said, was how Moral Re-Armament could be translated in terms of international relations between countries. 'Thank you for giving me that hope,' he concluded. 'From now on we will never give up.' As he left Caux he added, 'This has been one of the greatest experiences of my life.'48

Schuman continued to give regular support until Buchman's death in 1961. There has been speculation why Adenauer did not mention Buchman in his Memoirs. Similarly, although his name headed a list inviting a Moral Re-Armament mission to Germany in 1956, he does not seem to have attended its theatre production in Bonn. The latter is easily understandable in a busy statesman; but the former might seem to leave his attitude equivocal. However, he was continually in touch with Buchman through the years, asking his help.


In 1958, for example, when de Gaulle assumed power, Adenauer sent Buchman two personally signed messages, one for publication in the official government Bulletin, the other in a personal letter. The latter read in part: 'I share the conviction that now is the time more strongly than ever for European unity through Moral Re-Armament. You have given most valuable stimulus to the great work of unifying Europe. I am convinced with you that unless this work is carried forward, peace in the world cannot be maintained. Therefore, I would be extremely happy if you yourself could give your personal attention to it in the coming months, which are decisive for developments in Europe.'49 And when, in 1960, Adenauer visited Los Angeles, he specially asked Buchman to meet him there. It was their last meeting. 'I want to tell you with all the emphasis at my command how highly I value your work,' he told Buchman. 'It is essential for world peace.'50

Many Germans have confirmed this evaluation. For example, in 1960, when Dr Hasso von Etzdorf, Deputy Under Secretary of State at the German Foreign Office (formerly Ambassador to Canada and later, from 1961 to 1965, Ambassador to the United Kingdom), was asked by journalists in Atlanta, 'What is the most significant development since World War II?', he replied, 'The new accord between Germany and France, which I believe is permanent. For this the work of Moral Re-Armament is largely responsible.'51 'Dr von Etzdorf seems to have expressed this view in similar words in 1959.52 And it is a view to which he still subscribes,' Price concludes.53

When Buchman died in 1961 the German Government's official Bulletin wrote, 'Since 1947 Caux has been the symbol of Dr Buchman's work for the German people. Through it he brought Germany back into the circle of civilised nations, after Hitler had forbidden his movement in Germany and had earned for our country the distrust and disdain of other nations. At Caux every kind of German - politicians, scientists, industrialists and workers - met those who had been their bitter enemies during the war. So Caux became one of the great moral forces to which we owe our new standing in the world. For this Dr Buchman will never be forgotten. His name also stands for ever linked with the understanding between Germany and France, the foundations of which were laid by the first meetings between Germans and French at Caux.' Nor have these services been forgotten. In September 1982 the President of the German Federal Republic, Professor Dr Karl Carstens, received Moral Re-Armament delegates from twenty-two countries and said to them, 'During the post-war years, when we Germans regained acceptance in the international community and rebuilt relations with France, it was to a large extent due to Moral Re-Armament.'54


How then can Buchman's contribution to the reconciliation between Germany and France be summarised? First, it appears to be beyond dispute that, as the official Bulletin stated, he 'brought Germany back into the circle of civilised nations' - and, in so doing, reconciled German leaders with their opposite numbers in France and other European countries. Secondly, the work of Moral Re-Armament in the Ruhr and in French industry was an essential prerequisite to the uniting of the French and German coal and steel industries. Thirdly, Buchman's friendship with Adenauer, Schuman and other leading figures played a real, if unquantifiable, part in easing the negotiating process.

Yet, for Buchman himself, all this was a by-product of the work which he felt that God had laid upon him with individuals. When, on one occasion, a letter of praise reached him from Adenauer, he said to his friends, 'I am dumb-struck', and when he was decorated with the Order of Merit he accepted it 'mindful that it is an honour shared by every man and woman who played a part'.55


 1 Files of the Chancery of the Legion of Honour, Paris, 15 June 1950.

 2 New York Times, 18 December 1952; The Times, 19 December 1952.

 3 Evening Standard, l0 June 1950.

 4 New Statesman, 10 June 1950.

 5 Robert Rochefort: Robert Schuman (Editions du Cerf, 1968), p. 234.

 6 W. A. Visser 't Hooft: Zeugnis eines Boten 7, quoted by Eberhard Bethge: Dietrich Bonhoeffer (Collins, 1970), p. 648.

 7 Rochefort, p. 51.

 8 Georgette Elgey: La Republique des Illusions (Fayard, 1965), p. 304.

 9 France-Forum, November 1963; Rochefort, p. 231.

10 Interview in Veronese World Crisis and the Catholic, p. 5; quoted by Price, p. 40.

11 Report by Juliet Boobbyer of visits to Jean Monnet Institute, 9 August 1982 and February 1983.

12 Henri Rieben: Des Ententes de Maitres de Forges au Plan Schuman (Centre de recherches européennes, Lausanne, 1954), Part III, Section I, Ch. 5, p.327.

13 Reinhold Maier, Minister-President of Württemberg-Baden, speaking in Stuttgart, 11 October 1948, at an official reception for Buchman and The Good Road.

14 Caux transcripts, 13 September 1948.

15 Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 19 July 1959, 'Das Ruhrgebiet aus der Vogelschau'.

16 Philippe Mottu: The Story of Caux (Grosvenor, 1970), p. 118.

17 Martin MSS; cf. also Mottu, p. 118.

18 Spoerri, p.166.

19 Caux transcripts, 13 September 1953.

20 Buchman: Refaire le Monde (La Compagnie du Livre, 1950), p. v.

21 Caux transcripts, 12 September 1953.

22 Buchman to Robert Schuman, 1 May 1949.

23 Buchman to Karl Arnold, 4 May 1949.

24 Konrad Adenauer to Buchman, 13 June 1949.

25 L'Aube, 20 September 1949; New York Times, 6 June 1949.

26 Johnson, p. 584.

27 Report of the Caux Conference, 1949 (German edition, p. 45).

28 Price, p. 56.

29 See Spoerri, Dynamic out of Silence, pp. 166-7.

30 Schuman: Pour l'Europe (Nagel, 1963), pp. 93-4.

31 Konrad Adenauer: Memoirs (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966), p. 233.

32 Elgey, p.441.

33 Memo of Robert Murphy, US political adviser to General Clay, FRUS 1948, II, pp. 444-5.

34 Conversations with the author at the time.

35 Elgey, p. 422.

36 R. C. Mowat: Creating the European Community (Blandford, 1973), pp. 91-3.

37 Unpublished memo from participants.

38 Jean Monnet: Memoires (Fayard, 1976), p. 336.

39 Price, p. 50.

40 ibid., p. 51.

41 Rochefort, p. 264.

42 Richard Mayne: Postwar (Thames and Hudson, 1983), p. 302.

43 New York Times, 4 June 1951.

44 Price, p. 56.

45 Mowat, pp. 97-8.

46 New York Herald-Tribune, 4 June 1951.

47 News Chronicle, 10 May 1950. Also see Franz Rodens: Konrad Adenauer (Knaur, Munich/Zurich 1963), p. 119.

48 Caux transcripts: 12 September 1953.

49 Frank Buchman -Eighty, p. 203.

50 See Spoerri, Dynamic out of Silence, pp. 205-6.

51 Price, p. 3.

52 The Times, 4 June 1959.

53 Personal letter to Price, 3 September 1979, quoted Price, p. 6.

54 Event recorded in Banner Generalanzeiger, 16 September 1982. Extract taken from verbatim copy of speech issued by President's office.

55 At German Embassy, Delhi, 17 December 1952.